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Abstract 
This study reports some preliminary results of a research agenda that seeks to 
address the absence of tested metrics to provide early indication of the acquisition risks of 
interdependent programs. The overall goal of this research is to forge new ground on 
uncovering early indicators of interdependency acquisition risk, so appropriate governance 
mechanisms can then be isolated. Funding will allow the ability to 1) expand on an existing 
database of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAPs) performance data, 2) analyze the 
MDAPs to characterize the risks attributable to interdependence, and 3) determine whether 
acquisition setbacks cascade to downstream interdependent MDAP programs.  The 
deliverables of the effort are 1) a code book of DoD data acquisition items that can be 
employed in future research efforts, and 2) the results of the investigation of the cascading 
risks of interdependent acquisition efforts.   
In short, preliminary results indicate that perceptions of risk may prove influential on 
downstream program performance.  In terms of the direct influence that an upstream 
program’s performance might exert on downstream program performance, weak, but 
statistically significant, relationships were noted in three areas.  The next steps of the 
research are to 1) expand the dataset to include FY 2009 data, 2) document acquisition 
data, 3) collect a number of indicators on program interdependency, and 4) test a number of 







This research effort addresses two critical problems: 1) Data on major defense 
acquisition programs is piecemeal and fragmented, thus hindering acquisition research; 2) 
There is an absence of tested metrics to provide early indication of the acquisition risks of 
interdependent programs. 
A wealth of research indicates that the use of programmatic networks in the public 
sector is clearly on the rise (Weber & Khademian, 2008).  Noting that firms do not act by 
themselves, Granovetter (1973) witnessed that organizations are deeply embedded in 
“networks of external relationships” that influence the exchange of resources and 
capabilities among them.  Increasingly, state-, local-, and federal-level agencies are turning 
to joint interdependent programs to address gaps that only cross collaborative initiatives can 
span. Yet, as discussed below, the study of interdependency and its effects on program 
performance have yielded too few tangible results. For purposes of the discussion below, 
jointness, interdependency, exchange, and partnerships, all refer to a similar concept: the 
notion that autonomous organizations build relationships to provide capabilities that, when 
looked at in totality, form network structures. Additionally, at the individual pair-wise level, 
the exchanges are manifested as explicit transactions. 
Scholars have long contended that many contemporary policy challenges, and their 
associated solutions, lie across organizational domains outside the jurisdiction of any one 
agency (Gage & Mandell, 1990; Alexander, 1995; Agranoff, 2003).  Milward and Provan 
(2001) show that public policy arenas are inherently crosscutting; the requisite knowledge 
and corresponding solutions are not localized, but are instead distributed across a range of 
agencies and organizations. The DoD’s transformation to joint capabilities is in keeping with 
the ongoing trends.   Historically, acquisition investments at the DoD had been proposed as 
individual materiel solutions, typically championed by the armed service for which the 
product was to be obtained.  This gave rise to discrete systems designed in accordance with 
the individual service requirements.  When called upon to operate in a joint, multi-service 
environment, these systems exhibited problems interacting effectively with other service 
systems.   
The Transformation to Joint Capabilities attempts to provide military forces with the 
capability to adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances by leveraging a 
wider range of assets.  Central to the Transformation was the desire for enhanced 
coordination among agencies and across all levels of government (coalition, federal, state, 
and local).  In addressing the need for interagency cooperation, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani (2004) claimed that the integrated force had to become 
interdependent. That is, it must be capabilities-based, collaborative, and network centric.  
Military efforts require the ability to conduct high-level, or large-scale, vertical and horizontal 
collaboration. That means up and down the chain of command and across all capabilities 
and forces.   
While DoD agencies are expected to embrace joint capabilities, literature findings 
regarding the risks and best practice mechanisms of joint interdependent activities lag far 
behind.  Whereas early research did provide some insights, the research activities have 
stalled and progress is lacking.  For example, back in 1937, Coase found that 
interdependencies are based on mutual exchanges that can be examined at the transaction 
level.  He argued that these transactions accrued costs that could be attributed to 
establishing the rules of engagement, enforcing agreements, and monitoring compliance.  





In 1967, Thompson contributed to the research by offering a tripartite model that 
focused on the configurations of the transaction flows.  Sequential flows involved handoffs 
between partners.  Pooled flows involved partners that drew down from a common source of 
assets and the flows of reciprocal relationships involved feedback mechanisms.  Much of 
the research to date has been based on the anecdotal findings of small n case studies (Isett 
& Provan, 2005; Meier & O’Toole, 2008).   While the three configurations provide a starting 
point for understanding interdependent activities, the reality of today’s activities are far more 
complex. In short, it is not unusual for the acquisition or production of a service to 
incorporate multiple configurations with resources flowing in and out across organizations of 
public and private entities. As such, the most common configuration is the “mixed” pattern 
incorporating all three of the configurations and a wide array of nodes, assets, channels and 
zones.  
Exchange theorists argue that organizations develop interdependent relationships 
with other organizational entities to either obtain critical resources or provide critical 
capabilities. They also assert that interdependent relationships exhibit high levels of 
uncertainty due to participant 
constraints (Miles & Snow, 1978).  
Shirking or defection of a network 
member can have dire consequences 
on the survival and performance of 
the network in total and network 
participants in general.  Because of 
the nature and influence of the ties or 
interdependencies that bind 
organizations, Levinthal’s (1997) 
research indicated that increasing the 
density of the interdependencies that 
connect the organizations affects the 
complexity of the “landscape” in which 
it operates. Levinthal (1997) finds that 
these interconnections or flows can 
yield nonlinear consequences that 
often involve multiplier effects based 
on the nature of the 
interdependencies in the system.  
Apparently, the value chain of the joint 
capabilities is laden with junctions and bifurcations where delay, defection, or shirking can 
occur.  In fact, in 1999, Rosen argued that the uncertainty that arises from a relationship is 
the definition of “complexity.”  And that “complexity” can only be understood by examining 
the links that bind.  If Rosen is correct, then DoD acquisition is reaching unprecedented 
complexity.  A network analysis of MDAP data interdependencies suggests overwhelming 
complexity (see Figure 1).  The 78 MDAPs in 2005 demonstrated 989 unique links to other 
MDAPs as well as non-MDAP programs.  The yellow links indicate medium risk relationships 
and the red links show high risk links. 
Despite the activities, ten years ago Agranoff and McGuire (2001) wrote that “there 
are many more questions than answers in network management” and the assertion 
continues to ring true.  Apparently, the field is rich in anecdotal findings but poor in empirical 
evidence (Alexander, 1995). Oliver and Ebers (1998) liken the state of the field as a messy 





results. While the growth is clearly on the rise, DoD acquisition is moving forward with little 
insights into the risks and threats of joint efforts.  Without a deep understanding of the risks 
and threats that interdependent efforts encounter, governance mechanisms that can help to 
insure acquisition success are beyond reach.  Given the pace at which joint efforts are 
pursued, early indicators of acquisition risk are needed to help isolate the critical 
governance mechanisms that will mitigate performance shortfalls. 
Additionally, of utmost concern is the state of current acquisition data.  While several 
initiatives are underway to compile the sundry datasets the fragmented acquisition data puts 
decision-making at risk for Type I and Type II errors (false positive and false negative, 
respectively).  Funding for this research effort will allow the ability to integrate, cleanse, and 
normalize authoritative datasets for the purpose of advanced research.  It will also provide 
the ability to document the acquisition data for future research purposes.  The 
documentation will allow the research community to forge new insights in the acquisition 
arena.   
The study of DoD acquisition efforts for gaining insights on interdependency is 
especially fruitful.  First, the DoD has rich, but fragmented and piecemeal, datasets on some 
of the important key interdependencies of major defense acquisition programs.  Second, the 
movement toward joint capabilities makes an understanding of interdependencies especially 
critical.  Finally, given the frequency with which government agencies are moving toward 
joint initiatives, findings based on DoD programs may prove instrumental to a wide range 
audience. The research below examines the ties that bind organizations in light of two 
different types of transactions: data ties and funding ties. And it begs the questions: do the 
ties result in cascading acquisition risks?  The research will act as a catalyst for a long-term 
research program on the risks and governance mechanisms of joint acquisition initiatives.  
Research Objectives: The objectives of the research are as follows:  
1. To map program interdependence to reveal the directionality of influence (i.e., 
“upstream”/“downstream”) of cause-effect relationships, 
2.  To test the cascading risks that upstream programs exert on downstream 
programs in light of data and funding exchanges, 
3. To test the extent to which the cost overruns of upstream programs cascade 
on to interdependent downstream programs, 
4. To test the extent to which schedule delays cascade on to interdependent 
downstream programs, 
5. To use the findings to make recommendations on potential governance 
mechanisms that may prove capable of mitigating the risks of 
interdependencies, and  
6. To provide a research code book of acquisition data elements for future 
research efforts. 
The remaining discussion provides an interim report on some of the findings to date, 
based on the interdependent activities identified in the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Reviews (DAES).  The findings below examine the influence of interdependencies on a 





Research Methods: Because of data availability issues, the unit of analysis for 
this research was restricted to Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Starting in the 
2005 time period, Major Defense Acquisition Program managers were asked to provide 
reports on what they considered to be the critical interdependencies of their given program.  
They identified upstream and downstream connections and indicated the perceived risk 
level (red, yellow, green).  Because of a small number of red risks, the risk variable was 
recoded to reflect “no-risk,” “risky.”  Hence the “risk” variable is binomial in nature.  The 
research findings described below are based on the influences these interdependencies 
might exert on program performance. 
Program performance is considered from multiple vantage points.  Table 1 provides 
all the variables used in this research and the documents they were derived from.  In short, 
performance is based on 1) annual cost variance figures (for total cost variance and the 
subsets of schedule, estimation, and engineering cost variance in millions), 2) DAES 
breaches (schedule, performance, and Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) breaches), and 3) percent cost growth from the original RDT&E estimates. All 
variables were derived from Selected Annual Reports (SARs) and DAES reports.  Because 
2005 marked the first year that the DAES reports began reporting interdependencies, the 
analysis reported below is based on MDAP performance in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 
2007 (note: SAR reports were not reported in FY2008 due to the new presidential 
administration). 
Table 1. Variables Used in the Research 
Unit of Analysis: Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
Variable Data Source 
Count of APB Schedule Breaches 
Count of APB Performance Breaches 
Count of APB RDT&E Breaches 
Count of APB PAUC Breaches 
DAES 
Total Cost Variance 
Engineering Cost Variance 
Schedule Cost Variance 
Estimation Cost Variance 
SAR 
Percent Cost Growth SAR 
Data Exchange Interdependencies DAES Interdependency Charts 
As identified above, MDAP program managers were asked to provide insight on what 
they perceived to be the program’s interdependencies.  They also reported on the direction 
of the interdependency (inbound, outbound, and bidirectional) and the risk of the 
interdependency. The risk is based on the sender’s perceived risk with a downstream 
receiver.  Because performance data on non-MDAP programs were not available for 
analysis, the findings considered only the interdependencies that existed among MDAPs.  
Findings: Two major sets of findings are discussed below. The first is based on the 
influence of the sender’s perceived risk with the downstream receiver’s performance (during 





individual performance (during years 2005-2007).  To measure the sender’s perceived risk 
on their individual performance, the mean of the risk of all the relationships was calculated 
to provide an overall “risk” level for each MDAP.  The second set of findings is based on the 
sender’s performance and its influence on the receiver’s performance. Table 2 provides the 
means and standard deviations of all variables used in the research. The number of 
downstream programs per upstream MDAP ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of 5.  A total 
of 873 relationships were analyzed over the three-year time period. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Employed in the Research 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Upstream APB Schedule Breaches 269 .36 .481
Upstream APB RDT&E Breaches 522 .09 .289
Upstream APB PAUC Breaches 522 .08 .266
Upstream APB Performance Breaches 522 .13 .333
Downstream APB Schedule Breaches 518 .27 .444
Downstream APB Performance Breaches 522 .06 .240
Downstream APB RDT&E Breaches 522 .11 .319
Downstream APB PAUC Breaches 522 .11 .312
Upstream Perceived Risk 522 1.1073 .30977
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Upstream Percent Cost Growth 840 .08 1.00
Upstream Engineering Cost Variance 711 5.53 91.06
Upstream Schedule Cost Variance 711 4.76 38.31
Upstream Estimation Cost Variance 711 .32 159.33
Upstream Total Cost Variance 840 4.75 208.20
  
Downstream Percent Cost Growth 446 .014 .10
Downstream Engineering Cost Variance 351 -6.12 219.25
Downstream Schedule Cost Variance 351 3.77 25.05
Downstream Estimation Cost Variance 351 -7.95 324.36
Downstream Total Cost Variance 449 -38.79 400.26
 
Interdependency Risk.  The first set of tests sought to determine if the sender’s 
perceived risk of the relationship influenced its partnering receiver.  In terms of the “partner 
risk” variable, xx% of the MDAP program managers identified no risk in the partnerships. 
Xx% indicated some degree of risk in the relationships.  Of the 56 programs that indicated 
some risk, the risk ranged from a low of 1.1 to a high of 2 (recall that the variable ranges 
from “1” to “2,” with “1” indicating no risk).  Correlation coefficients were then obtained (see 
Table 3).  The data show that the Manager’s Perception of Risk is negatively with the 





Interestingly, risk was correlated with the downstream partner’s performance, RDT&E, and 
PAUC breaches, but in a positive direction.  The fact that an upstream partner’s perception 
of risk might result in an increase in the number of DAES’ breaches illustrates the 
detrimental influence that upstream programs might exert on their downstream partners.  
But, why the negative relationship with cost variance?  Why would an increasing perception 
of risk on the upstream program result in reducing the cost variance of its downstream 
partners?  Perhaps the answer lies in the old adage that perceptions of risk result in 
increased attention.  Perhaps, under high-risk situations, program managers are more 
cognizant of the risk and act to mitigate the detrimental effects.  More research is clearly 
warranted to tease out why these correlations are demonstrated. 
Table 3. Bivariate Correlation with MDAP Program Manager’s Perception of Risk 
MDAP’s Percent Cost Growth -.024 
MDAP’s  Total Cost Variance .019 
MDAP’s Engineering Cost Variance -.081* 
MDAP’s Schedule Cost Variance -.007 
MDAP’s Estimation Cost Variance .05 
MDAP’s Schedule Breaches .05 
MDAP’s  Performance Breaches .11* 
MDAP’s RDT&E Breaches .13** 
MDAP’s PAUC Breaches -.05 
Downstream MDAP’s Percent Cost Growth -.07 
Downstream MDAP’s  Total Cost Variance -.12** 
Downstream MDAP’s Engineering Cost Variance -.22** 
Downstream MDAP’s Schedule Cost Variance -.05 
Downstream MDAP’s Estimation Cost Variance -.11* 
Downstream MDAP’s Schedule Breaches .07 
Downstream MDAP’s  Performance Breaches .13** 
Downstream MDAP’s RDT&E Breaches .09* 
Downstream MDAP’s PAUC Breaches .12** 
* p < .05                  ** p < .00 
 
The next step of the “risk” analysis sought to isolate whether the MDAP’s mean risk 
score influenced their own specific performance.  The results show that the manager’s 
perception of risk is positively correlated with the program’s engineering cost variance.  
Outside of engineering cost variance, despite recognition of risk, no notable correlations 
were demonstrated in terms of DAES breaches, cost variance, or cost growth.   
The second set of tests sought to identify whether the performance of upstream 
programs exert influence on their downstream partner’s performance.  Because an 
upstream program’s influence would not expect to have an immediate effect, the data were 
lagged a year.  In other words, one might expect that the negative effects of an upstream 





of the sender’s performance on the downstream partners.  The results show little influence 
on APB breaches.  A weak, but statistically significant, relationship was demonstrated 
between the number of upstream program RDT&E breaches and the number of downstream 
program RDT&E breaches.  In terms of the influence of the upstream program’s percent 
growth, it showed no correlation with the downstream program’s percent growth.  Two of the 
cost variance relationships also showed weak, but statistically significant, correlations.  The 
sender’s total cost variance appeared to exert some influence on the downstream program’s 
schedule variance.  In addition, as the sender’s engineering cost variance rose, a 
subsequent rise was also noted in the downstream program’s percent cost growth. 
Table 4. The Influence of the Sender’s Performance on Downstream Programs  
FY 2005-2007 (Lag of One Year) 
 
Conclusions 
The results discussed above are the preliminary interim results of a segment of 
research that seeks to identify the influences that interdependencies might exert on 
acquisition program performance.  In short, the results indicate that perceptions of risk may 
prove influential on downstream program performance.  In terms of the direct influence that 
an upstream program’s performance might exert on downstream program performance, 
weak, but statistically significant, relationships were noted in three areas. In subsequent 
months, we will complete the data collection effort and construct and test a series of 
interdependency metrics on program performance.  The data will be modeled using 
traditional statistical approaches to assess causality.  Additionally, we will employ Markov 
Decision Process (MDP)-based methods (Puterman, 1994) to take into account the cost and 
schedule variance specifications from the n-ordered downstream programs and produce a 
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specification of the best possible budget trimming options for the decision-maker. Formally, 
a MDP is a probabilistic model of a sequential decision problem, in which states can be 
perceived exactly, and the current state and action selected determine a probability 
distribution on future states (Bertsekas, 1987). Specifically, the outcome of applying an 
action to a state depends only on the current action and state (and not on preceding actions 
or states). We assume that state changes in our model occur only at discrete instances of 
time, allowing us to model the network as a discrete event dynamic system (DEDS) and plan 
to employ MDPs. Our model facilitates the data acquisition process since we iteratively 
refine the state features critical to the decision-making. The action space will capture 
information about the funders, including changes in level of funding. We plan to model the 
probability of transitions from one state to another empirically by using existing data. The 
“Reward” function will be the presence of a schedule delay and cost variance that occurs in 
n-ordered downstream programs. Hence, we will be assessing various interdependency 
metrics in light of statistical and MDP methods to isolate the most feasible method for 
understanding interdependencies. 
In short, the next steps of the research are to 1) expand the dataset to include FY 
2009 data, 2) document existing acquisition data sources, 3) collect a number of indicators 
on program interdependency, and 4) test a number of interdependency diversity metrics in 
terms of their ability to provide insights on program performance. 
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